UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-9-2008

Grover v. Wadsworth Respondent's Brief Dckt.
34810

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Grover v. Wadsworth Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34810" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1743.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1743

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

FILED - COPY
APR - 9 2008
SujllMl!e court _court of Appoals
EnteredonATSby:_ -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OFTHE STATE OF IDAHO
No. 34810
BLAIR AND JOANN GROVER,
Plaintiff/Respondent
V.

NORMA E. WADSWORTH, individually, and NORMA E. WADSWORTH and or JANE DOE
as Personal Representative of the Estate of A. EARL WADSWORTH
Defendants/Appellant

RESPONDENT BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County ofBormeville.
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.

Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado, Idaho Falls, ID 83404

David A. Johnson, ISB No. 3319
Wright, Wright & Johnson, PLLC
P.O. Box 52251
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondent

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 1
A.

Nature of the Case.......................................................................................................... 1

B.

Course of Proceedings ................................................................................................... 1

C.

Statemeut of Facts .......................................................................................................... 3

II.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ................................................................................... 8

III.

ARGUMENT ......•..•...•..•..........•.•..........•..•........................•....•.•..•..••••.•.••.••.•..•....••............. 8

A.

The district court properly granted summary judgment........................................... 8
1.

Standard of Review ........................................................................................................ 8

2.

The district court properly granted summary judgment based on an account
stated . ....................................................................................

u ...........................................

9

a.

The parties mutually examined the respective claims....................................... 11

b.

The parties mutually assented to the $54,984.23 balance.................................. 15

3. Any mistake was unilateral and is not a defense....................................................... 20
4.

The district court properly applied the doctrine of estoppel................................... 24
a.

The Wadsworths made specific representations to the Grovers ...................... 25

b.

The Grovers' reliance was foreseeable ............................................................... 26

c.

The Grovers' reliance was reasonable and justified.......................................... 27

d.

The Court should affirm even if Promissory Estoppel is improper................. 30

The district court appropriately awarded the Grovers their attorney fees ............ 31

B.
1.

Standard of Review ...................................................................................................... 31

Respondent Brief

1

2. The case involves a commercial transaction .............................................................. 32

C.
IV.

3.

Blair Grover's status as an attorney with Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA.................. 33

4.

Attorney fees were properly awarded against Norma Wadsworth ......................... 35
Denial of Summary Judgment is not reviewable ....................................................... 36
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 36

Respondent Brief

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Argonaut Ins. Cos. v. Tri-West Constr. Co., 107 Idaho 643,691 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1984) ..... 15
Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 747 P.2d 1315 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................................. 19
Assocs. Nw. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1987) ........................................... 31
Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636,671 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1983) ................................................ 21
Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 39 P.3d 592 (2001) ...................................................................... 23
Billow v. Preco. Inc., 132 Idaho 23,966 P.2d 23 (1998) .............................................................. 17
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007) ................................. 32
Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006) .................... 31
Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006) ........................................................ 31
Costello v. Watson, 111 Idaho 68, 720 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App. 1986) .............................................. 18
Cox v. Clayton, 137 Idaho 492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002) ..................................................................... 32
Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 9 P.3d 534 (2000) ................................ 17
Dennet v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,936 P.2d 219 (1997) ................................................................ 32
Eighteen Mile Ranch,LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130
(2005) ........................................................................................................................................ 33

Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth., 78 Ohio 3d
353, 678 N.E.2d 519 (l 997)...................................................................................................... 17

Giefer v. Swenton, 23 Kan. App. 2d 172,928 P.2d 906 (1960) .................................................... 18
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002) ........................ 25

Respondent Brief iii

Gunn v. Perseverance Mining & Milling Co., 23 Idaho 418, 130 P.458 (1913) .......................... 14
Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005) .................................... 36
Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002) ........................................................ 36
Hunting v. Clark County Sch. Dist.No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,931 P.2d 628 (1997) ...................... 28
Intermountain Eye and Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 127 P.3d 121 (2005) ...... 8
Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270,833 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992) .......... 31
Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872,811 P.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1991) .................................................... 31
Kromei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986) ...................................................... 9
MT. Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 759 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1988) .......................... 10
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 119 Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (1991) ...................... 17
Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1988) ........................................................................... 23
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003) ............................................................. 24
Mihalka v. Shepherd, 2008 Ida. LEXIS 57 (March 28, 2008) ...................................................... 24
Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 741 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1987) .................................................... 32
Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho 438, 797 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1990) ................................................ 10
O'Harrow v. Salmon River Uranium Dev., Inc., 84 Idaho 427,373 P.2d 336 (1962) ................. 10
Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389, 94 P.3d 694 (2004) ....................................................................... 30
Russell v. Russell, 99 Idaho 151,578 P.2d 1082 (1978) ............................................................... 18
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 18 P.3d 956 (2000) ..................................... 17
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004) .................................. 8
Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986) .............................................. 32

Respondent Brief

1v

Stout v. Key Training Corp., 158 P.3d 971 (Idaho 2007) ............................................................. 31
Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1989) ................. 33
Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., Inc., 2007 Ida. LEXIS 210 (January 10, 2008) ............................ 18
Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 915 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 8
Statutes

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 12-120(3) ..................................................................................................... 34
Rules

IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2007) ......................................................................................................... 9
Treatises

5-24 Corbin on Contracts§ 24.21 (2007) .................................................................................... 17
Corbin on Contracts§ 72.1.4 (2003) ............................................................................................ 11
Other Authorities

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 153 ................................................................................ 22
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90 .................................................................................. 25
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 202(2) ....................................................................... 18

Respondent Brief v

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.

The dispute between Blair and Joann Grover (the Grovers) and the defendants
(collectively the Wadsworths) centers on a piece of commercial property located in Idaho Falls,
Idaho. In 1997, the Grovers purchased the property for $104,000.00. The Grovers paid
approximately $48,000.00 in cash. The Grovers assumed, and the Wadsworths consented to the
assumption, of a Promissory Note in the amonnt of $54,984.23.
The Grovers have :fully performed their obligations under the contract.
B. Course of Proceedings.

On June 7, 2006, the Grovers filed suit to quiet title in Bonneville County concerning the
subject property. 1 The Wadsworths filed their Answer, Counterclaim, and Request for Jury Trial
on October 17, 2006. 2 Norma Wadsworth verified the pleading.3 The Grovers filed their Reply
to Counterclaims on November 8, 2006. 4
On February 8, 2007, the Wadsworths moved for summary judgment. 5 The Grovers filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 21, 2007. 6 The Court heard oral argument on
1

R Vol. I, pp. 7-26.

2

R Vol. I, pp. 27-61.

3

R Vol. I, p. 38.

4

R Vol. I, pp. 66-71.

5

R Vol. II, pp. 126-27.

6

See R Vol. II, p. 159.

'
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March 21, 2007. 7 The Court rendered its decision on April 5, 2007. 8 The Court denied both
motions for summary judgment. 9
Prior to trial, the Grovers filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court on
September 27, 2007. 10 The Wadsworths also moved for reconsideration on October 5, 2007. 11
The Court heard oral argument on October l 0, 2007. 12 At the hearing the parties both stipulated
to proceeding in this matter without a jury. 13 The Court granted the Grovers' Motion for
Reconsideration on October 18, 2007. 14 The Wadsworths filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration or Motion for Clarification on October 24, 2007. 15 The Court denied the
Second Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for Clarification on November 16, 2007. 16 The
Court entered Judgment quieting title in the Grovers and dismissing the Wadsworths'

7

R Vol. II, p. 183

8

R Vol. II, pp. 185-94.

9

R Vol. II, pp. 185-94.

10

R Vol. II, p. 211.

11

R Vol. III, p. 226A

12

R Vol. III, p. 237.

13

R Vol. III, p. 238; Tr. Hr'g p. 38, 11.21-24 (October 10, 2007).

14

R Vol. III, p. 240-56.

15

R Vol. III,p.317A

16

R Vol. N, p. 376
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counterclaims with prejudice on November 16, 2007.

17

The Grovers timely filed their Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Affidavit of
Counsel on November 2, 2007. 18 The Wadsworths filed their objections to the Grovers'
memorandum on November 5, 2007, 19 to which the Grovers responded on November 13, 2007.

20

The Court issued a decision regarding the Grovers' request for attorney fees on December 5,
2007. 21 The Court granted judgment to the Grovers for attorney fees and costs.

22

The Wadsworths filed their first Notice of Appeal on November 20, 2007.
Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on January 9, 2008.

23

A Second

24

C. Statement of Facts.
In 1990, William Porter Gaston (Gaston) and Dennis Jensen (Jensen) purchased the
subject property from A. Earl Wadsworth (Earl) for $115,000.00.

25

Gaston and Jensen paid Earl

a down payment and Earl took a Promissory Note in the amount of $80,500.00 and secured the
17

R Vol. IV, pp. 373-74.

18

R Vol. IV, pp. 340-57.

19

R Vol. IV, pp. 361-63.

20

R Vol. IV, pp. 364-72.

21

R Vol. IV, pp. 385-89.

22

R Vol. IV., pp. 390-91

23

R Vol. IV, pp. 378-82.

24

R Vol. IV, pp. 405-09

25

R Vol. I, pp. 40-54.
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Promissory Note by a Deed ofTrust. 26 The parties do not dispute that Earl sent Gaston and
Jensen yearly amortization schedules written by hand. These amortizations show the application
to interest and principal from the $777.28 monthly payment as set out in the Promissory Note.
In 1997, the Grovers negotiated with Gaston and Jensen27 for the purchase of the subject
property. 28 During the course of these negotiations, Gaston told the Grovers that there was an
outstanding note on the building from Gaston's purchase of the building in 1990.29 Gaston told
the Grovers that they would have to assume the note in order to purchase the building. 30 The
Grovers responded that assuming the note would not be a problem but that the Grovers would
have to know the outstanding balance on the note. 31 Gaston told the Grovers that he believed the
balance on the note was approximately $56,000.00, and that he would find out the exact amount
from Earl, who held the note. 32

26

R Vol. I, pp. 50-54.

27

It is important to point out that Jensen died some time prior to the 1997 transaction and was

involved in the transaction only by virtue of his estate. For all intents and purposes, Gaston was
the primary individual with whom the Grovers negotiated.
28

R Vol. II, pp. 128-33.

29

R Vol. II, p. 129; R Vol. III, p. 283, 11. 4-15.

30

R Vol. III, p. 283, II. 4-15.

31

R Vol. III, p. 283, IL 4-15.

32

R Vol. III, p 283, Blair Grover Dep. 33:16-21.
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Gaston later presented the Grovers with a handwritten statement from Earl showing that
in May 1997, the principal balance due on the Note was $54,984.23. 33 The Wadsworths concede
that the 1996/1997 amortization schedule is written entirely in Earl's handwriting. The Grovers
agreed to pay $104,000.00 by assuming the balance of the Promissory Note owed to Earl, and
paying the difference between the balance owed and the purchase price in cash to Gaston.

34

Blair Grover prepared the Consent to Assignment and Assumption, and Release (the
Consent). 35 Earl and Norma E. Wadsworth signed the Consent on April 30, 1997.

36

The

Consent provides "Attached hereto marked Exhibits A and Bis a copy of a proposed Warranty
Deed, and an Assignment and Assumption Agreement for [the] purpose [of transferring Gaston
and Jensen's interest in the propertyJ."37 The Consent continues, "As set forth therein, Grovers
will assume the balance owed on the note and continue making the payments thereon according
to its terms."38 The language refers to the Assignment. The Assignment provides:
Assignors have heretofore entered into an agreement to purchase the following
described real property located in Bonneville County, Idaho:

33

R Vol. I, p. 129; R Vol. III p. 277; Norma Wadsworth Dep. Ex. 3; R Vol. III, p. 283; Grover
Dep. 35:20-24.

34

R Vol. Ill, p. 285, Blair Grover Dep. 42:1-7.

35

R Vol. Ill, p. 285, Blair Grover Dep. 15-19.

36

R Vol. I, pp. 58-59.

37

R Vol. I, pp. 58-59.

38

R Vol. I, pp. 58-59.
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Lots 17, 18, 19 and 20 lying East of U.S. Highway 191, in Block 12, Capitol Hill
Addition to the City of Idaho Falls, County of Bonneville, State of Idaho,
according to the recorded plat thereof.
From A. Earl Wadsworth and Norma E. Wadsworth, husband and wife. In
connection with the agreement they have executed a Promissory Note with an
approximate balance due of$56,000.00 secured by a Deed of Trust dated September
17, 1990 and recorded under Bonneville County Record's No. 793643. 39
The Assigmnent continues:
Grovers Assume: Grovers hereby assume and agree to be bound by the Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust, copies of which are attached hereto marked Exhibits A and
B, and to pay the balance of the Promissory Note, in the amount of approximately
$56,000.00, to Wadsworth pursuant to the terms thereof. 40
Through Gaston, Earl told the Grovers what the balance of the note was. Thus, the
Grovers agreed to pay the balance of the note, as expressly represented by Earl in his
amortizations, until it was paid in full, whenever that would be. 41 The Grovers did not know
whether there had been prepayments on the note, whether there had been any forgiveness of the
note, or any other alteration of the amount owed. 42 The Grovers similarly did not kuow whether
Gaston and Jensen had missed payments extending the pay-off of the note.

43

Following the execution of these documents, Gaston,.Jensen, and the Grovers closed on
the sale of the subject property. The closing documents specify the exact amount the Grovers
39

R Vol. I, pp. 55-56.

40

R Vol. I, pp. 55-56.

41

R Vol. III, p. 285, Blair Grover Dep. 42:1-7.

42

R Vol. III, p. 284, Blair Grover Dep. 38: 19-39:6.

43

R Vol. III, p. 284: Blair Grover Dep. 38:19-39:6.
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were agreeing to assume on the note. 44 The Letter of Closing Instructions states that the sales
price for the subject property was $104,000.00. 45 The $104,000.00 was comprised of$1,000.00
of earnest money, approximately $47,524.93 in cash, and an assumption of $54,984.23. 46 Grover
actually paid $48,000.00 in cash to Gaston and Jensen.

47

The closing Settlement Statement

provides that the Grovers assumed the Deed of Trust only in the amount of$54,984.23. 48 The
Wadsworths consented to this assumption in writing.

49

Earl furnished amortizations to the Grovers every calendar year commencing in 1997
showing how Earl applied the payments to the balance of the Promissory Note. 50 The
amortization schedules were always consistent with the $54,984.23 balance as represented at the
time of the sale.
Earl died on March 18, 2006.
Norma Wadsworth (Norma) had no involvement in keeping the books for the
transaction. 51 The amortizations were exclusively kept and prepared by Earl. 52 Norma has no
44

R Vol. II, pp. 213-26.

45

R Vol. II, pp. 213-26.

46

R Vol. II, pp. 213-26.

47

R Vol. II, pp. 213-26.

48

R Vol. II, pp. 213-26.

49

R Vol. I, pp. 58-59.

50

R Vol. II, pp. 128-55.

51

R Vol. III, p. 274, Norma Wadsworth Dep. 15:14-20.
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lmowledge of the amounts owed on the note. Norma failed to establish that the amount owning
at the time of the assumption was anything other than $54,984.23. Norma misrepresented the
amount owed in her verified pleadings. Norma does not know how the amounts were calculated.
The Grovers timely paid the assumption amount of $54,984.23 plus interest.
II. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Grovers are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12120(3) and as the prevailing party under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tyler
v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524,915 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1996). Idaho Appellate Rule 41 justifies the
Grovers' request for attorney fees on appeal and the Court may determine the amount of fees to
be awarded pursuant to its discretion under this Rule.
III.

ARGUMENT
A. The district court properly granted summary judgment.
1. Standard of Review.

The standard of review for cases decided on cross-motions for summary judgment is the
same standard as used by the district judge when originally ruling on the motion. Intermountain
Eye and Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218,222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005). Summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140
Idaho 354,360, 93 P.3d 685,691 (2004); see also IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2007). The fact that
52

R Vol. III, p. 274, Norma Wadsworth Dep. 15:14-20.
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both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Kromei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321
(1986). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the applicable standard of review is the
summary judgment standard and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits.
Shawver, 140 Idaho at 360, 93 P.3d at 691.
In this case, the parties stipulated to trying this case without a jury. In Shawver, the court
said:
When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of
fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed
evidence properly before it and grant the sununary judgment despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences .... The test for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is
whether the record reasonably supports the inferences.

Id. at 360-61, 93 P.3d at 691-92. Thus, the court must evaluate whether the district court made
reasonable inferences even though conflicting inferences may be supported in the record. If the
record supports the inferences made by the district court, then this Court must affirm. Id.
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment based on an
account stated.
The yearly amortization schedules generate the favorable inferences that Earl agreed with
the $54,984.23 balance, had investigated that balance, and knew that the Grovers would rely on
his representations for the transaction with Gaston. The Wadsworths make the gratuitous
comment in their brief that they "could find no authority in this state, or in any other state,
wherein accounts stated have ever been used in the context of a real estate transaction." 53 The

53

Appellant Br. 8.
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Wadsworths do not point out any case law that suggests that the doctrine of account stated is
inapplicable to contracts for the sale of real estate. There is no rule oflaw preventing the
theory's application where a piece ofland is the subject matter of a contract. However, the Idaho
Court of Appeals commented that "any" written account may become an account stated. M. T.

Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614,616, 759 P.2d 905,907 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, it does
not appear that a real estate contract is excluded from becoming an account stated.
The Idaho Supreme Court in O'Harrow v. Salmon River Uranium Dev., Inc., 84 Idaho
427, 373 P.2d 336 (1962), required two things of an account stated:
•

Mutual examination of the claims of each other by the parties; and,

•

Mutual agreement between [the parties] as to the correctness of the allowance and
disallowance of the respective items or claims and of the balance as struck upon
the final adjustment of the whole account and demands on both sides.

Id. at 430-31, 373 P.2d at 338. After O'Harrow, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
An account stated is a document, a writing, which exhibits the state of account between
[the] parties and the balance owed one to the other, and when assented to, either
expressly or impliedly, it becomes a new contract .... But the account, in order to
constitute a contract, should appear to be something more than a mere memorandum; it
should show upon its face that it was intended to be a final settlement up to date, and this
should be expressed with clearness and certainty.

Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho 438, 442-43, 797 P.2d 146, 150-51 (Ct. App. 1990). The
requirement from the Needs court that the "intent" be expressed with clearness and certainty,
does not establish a substantive burden of proof for an account stated.
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In these circumstances, the creditor bears the burden of establishing the existence and
amonnt of the original debt. See Corbin on Contracts § 72. 1.4 (2003 ).
The facts of this case satisfy both elements of an acconnt stated.
a. The parties mutually examiued the respective claims.
The most probable inference from the evidence is that the Grovers did precisely what is
expected of buyers nnder these circumstances: the Grovers asked the bookkeeper and Note
holder about the Note's balance. The Grovers' conduct was appropriate under the
circumstances. The facts strongly support the reasonable and logical inference that the
Wadsworths, or more specifically Earl, performed the requisite examination of the balance.
In this case, the Grovers adequately examined the Wadsworths' claims. Blair Grover
(Blair) testified:
[Gaston] told me that there was a contract that he was paying off and that I would have to
assume it because you couldn't pay it early. That's what I remember him telling me.
I said, well, that's okay. I can assume a contract, we'll have to !mow what the balance is.
I agreed to pay him $104,000. I said, if we're going to assume the contract, we have to
subtract that from the amount you're going to get. That's pretty elementary. He
nnderstood that.
In those conversations, I said to him, how much do you owe, and he said in substance,
about $56,000.00. I'm not sure. The seller, Mr. Wadsworth, keeps track of that. In
substance, that's what he told me. I said, well, we'll have to get the figures then from
Mr. Wadsworth.
At the time I did the earnest money, we didn't have them. I wrote in there that I would
assume the balance of approximately 56,000 because that's what he thought, and I think
it was based on his last schedule he'd received from Mr. Wadsworth, which showed on
what exhibit we looked at $56,234. I think that's where he came up with 56,000 that he
thought he owed.

Respondent Brief 11

The way I remember it, Mr. Jolmson, is that within a few days he brought to me the
schedule that shows the 54,984.23 and said that Earl had furnished that to him, and this
was now the balance owed. I said, are you satisfied with that. He indicated that that was
the amount due, that Earl was keeping track ofit, and if that's what Earl said, that's what
it was. 54
The Wadsworths do not dispute this testimony with any admissible evidence. Any amortization
schedule run by the Grovers would have been based solely on the balance represented by Earl.
Consequently, the Grovers' reliance on Earl's representations was reasonable. The Grovers
could not have gone to a third party, i.e., a bank, and figured out the balance of the Note. Earl
held the note and did the bookkeeping. Earl prepared yearly amortization schedules for Gaston,
Jensen, and subsequently the Grovers. 55 Earl possessed all of the information that the Grovers
could have possibly used in examining the balance of the Note. 56 When Gaston came to the
Grovers after receiving the 1996/1997 amortization schedule, Blair asked Gaston if the balance
looked correct. 57 Gaston concurred with the balance as stated by Earl. 58 Both the original seller
and the original buyer agreed to the Note's balance. 59 The only logical and reasonable inference

54

R Vol. III, p. 283, Blair Grover Dep. 33:4-34:12

55

See R. Vol. III, p. 274, Norma Wadsworth Dep. 15:5-19.

56

R Vol. III, p. 274, Norma Wadsworth Dep. 15:5-19.

57

R Vol. III, p. 283, Blair Grover Dep. 34:5-12.

58

R Vol. III, p. 283, Blair Grover Dep. 34:5-12.

59

R Vol. III, p. 283, Blair Grover Dep. 34:5-12; R Vol. III, p. 284, Blair Grover Dep. 39:2540:19.
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and construction of the evidence was that Earl represented the accurate amount.

60

Thus, the

district court committed no error.
Similarly, there is no dispute that Earl prepared the 1996/1997 amortization schedule.
Earl's wife, Norma, authenticated Earl's handwriting. The 1996/1997 amortization schedule is
unique among all of the other handwritten amortizations that Earl prepared. This particular
amortization has a balance calculated in the middle of the year. 61 No other amortization schedule
contains a balance interpolation. 62 The most probable inference from this fact is that the
1996/1997 amortization was specially created due to the Grovers' inquiry into the balance owed
on the Note. This inference is corroborated by the clear statement, in Earl's handwriting, that at
the time the building was sold to the Grovers the "Bal[ance] due on principal"" $54,984.23."

63

Unfortunately, Earl's death precludes a full inquiry into the extent of his examination of
the claims. However, the Wadsworths have no admissible evidence demonstrating that Earl's
investigation was somehow defective. Norma possesses no personal knowledge of the

60

In fact, there has never been a sufficient showing by the Wadsworths that a mistake was

actually made. There is an equal and compelling inference based on the admissible evidence that

no mistake was made and that this is merely an effort to get more money than the Wadsworths
are owed from the Grovers.
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transaction. 64 She was not involved in the sale of the property beyond her signing the Consent. 65
However, as noted by the district court, the most probable and logical inference from the
evidence is that Earl would have provided an accurate balance and a figure that would maximize
his return. 66 As the bookkeeper for the Note, it is a probable and logical inference that Earl
evaluated the outstanding balance before reaching the $54,984.23 amount. The Wadsworths
presented the district court with no evidence suggesting that the 1996/1997 amortization
schedule was not intended as a definite statement of account to Gaston and the Grovers. There is
no qualifying language in the balance statement. The only probable and logical inference is that
Earl investigated the balance before delivering the 1996/1997 amortization schedule to Gaston.
The Wadsworths' suggestion that an account stated is "not necessarily created, even if the
parties had met and mutually signed a document" is inapplicable to this case. The Wadsworths
rely upon Gunn v. Perseverance Mining & Milling Co., 23 Idaho 418, 130 P.458 (1913), for their
suggestion. However, Gunn involved different facts than the present case. In Gunn, the Court
found that the evidence suggested that the parties had not settled specific accounts. Id. at 421,
130 P. at 459. In this case, there was only one account examined by the parties. The most
probable inference from the evidence is that both parties desired to accurately ascertain the
balance of the Note. The Gunn decision is ofno value in this case.
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b. The parties mutually assented to the $54,984.23 balance.
"An account stated action requires showing of mutual assent that an amount is the final
balance of account agreed to by the parties and a writing evidencing the final balance. Assent
may be implied from failure to object to a billing within a reasonable time." M. T. Deaton & Co.
v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 616, 759 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1988). Silence may be used to

support the inference ofan agreement as to the correctness of the amount. Needs v. Hebener,
118 Idaho 438,443, 797 P.2d 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1990); see also Argonaut Ins. Cos. v. Tri-West
Constr. Co., 107 Idaho 643,646,691 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ct. App. 1984).

The only logical and reasonable construction of the evidence is that both the Grovers and
the Wadsworths intended for the $54,984.23 balance to be used as a definite and final account
stated on the Note. It is important to note that Judge St. Clair wrote that it appeared from the
evidence that "all parties agreed to an amount due under the original sales contract and
promissory note."67 The Wadsworths used the $54,984.23 balance for seven years following the
sale. 68 The most logical inference from this evidence is that Earl agreed that the $54,984.23
balance was correct. Gaston agreed with the Wadsworth's statement of the account. 69 Blair
testified that he accepted Earl's and Gaston's representations that the balance was $54,984.23. 70
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The Wadsworths failed to timely object to the $54,984.23 balance. The Wadsworths
used this number over a seven year period. 71 There is also no dispute that the Wadsworths
provided the handwritten amortization schedules. Since the Wadsworths sent the amortizations
schedules to the Grovers, there is sufficient evidence in the record that the Wadsworths assented
to the contents of those amortization schedules. See MT. Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho
614,617, 759 P.2d 905,908 (Ct. App. 1988). In MT. Deaton, an accounting firm had sent its
client regular statements of account, including a balance. Id. at 615, 759 P.2d at 906. The Court
of Appeals found that since the accountant sent the statements of account to Deaton's client there
was sufficient evidence of assent. Id. at 617, 759 P.2d at 908. This case is factually similar. The
Wadsworths functioned as the accountant for the Note. The Wadsworths sent the amortization
schedules to Gaston and the Grovers. Therefore, even if there are conflicting inferences that
could be drawn from this evidence, the inference drawn by the district court should be sustained
because it is logical and probable inference.
Furthermore, the Wadsworth's assent to the $54,984.23 balance is supported by the
signed Consent. In the Consent, Earl and Norma Wadsworth both consented to a limited
assumption of the Promissory Note by the Wadsworths. 72 Earl ratified the number he
represented to Gaston and the Grovers repeatedly over a period of approximately seven years.
Idaho recognizes the axiom that when "construing a written instrument, [courts] must
consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible."
71
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Selldrk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437, 18 P.3d 956,959 (2000); see also
Intermountain Eye and Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218,222, 127 P.3d 121, 125
(2005)(quoting Daugharry v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 73 I, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538
(2000)); Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 119 Idaho 558,565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310
(1991). When au agreement is unambiguous, then the Court has the power to construe it and
apply its language. Billow v. Preco. Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 227, 966 P.2d 23, 27 (1998). One
treatise on contract law commented:
In many instances, however, the terms of agreement may be expressed in two or more
separate documents, some of these containing promises aud statements as to
consideration, and others, such as deeds, mortgages and trust indentures, embodying the
performances agreed upon rather than a statement of terms to be performed. In every
such case, these documents should interpreted together, each one assisting in determining
the meaning intended to be expressed by the others.
5-24 Corbin on Contracts§ 24.21 (2007). The treatise continued:
There are numerous additional examples of cases in which courts have· interpreted
contracts by viewing the entire context, consisting of the additional parts of the contract
and the circumstances surrounding the making and performance of the contract. ...
A business transaction in which a contract is made will often consist of many
communications and other actions. Although it is not always possible to determine the
exact boundaries of each transaction, i.e., the act with which it began and that with which
it ended, one transaction can generally be separated from another for purposes of
interpretation and adjudication.

Id.
The Supreme Court of Ohio stated that "most important to this case, a writing, or
writings, executed as part of the same transaction, will be read as a whole, and the intent of each
part will be gathered from a consideration of the whole." Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v.

Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth., 78 Ohio 3d 353,361,678 N.E.2d 519,526 (1997).
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The Kansas Appellate Court commented that "two or more instruments executed in the course of
the same transaction, concerning the same subject matter, may generally be construed together."
Giefer v. Swenton, 23 Kan. App. 2d 172,928 P.2d 906 (1960). These views are consistent with
the second Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement opines that "a writing is interpreted as a
whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(2). Idaho has cited the Restatement's guidance
with approval. See Costello v. Watson, 111 Idaho 68, 72, 720 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Ct. App. 1986).
The Consent expressly refers to Exhibits A and B. 73 By virtue of those references, they
are a part of the agreement even if they were not physically attached to the document at the time
Earl and Norma signed the Consent. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 99 Idaho 151, 154, 578 P.2d
I 082, 1085 (I 978) (stating that in the real estate transaction context that "it would be pure
semantics to say that although the legal description was referred to in the earnest money
agreement, it was not part of the contract because it was not attached by a staple. Attachment
does not require any specific physical act.") The failure to fully read a contract prior to signing
the contract does not excuse performance. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., Inc., 2007 Ida. LEXIS
210 (January 10, 2008). Thus, any arguments that those Exhibits were not a part of the Consent
are frivolous. The Consent clearly referenced the Exhibits, the Exhibits were a part of the
Consent, and the Exhibits' contents were agreed to by the Wadsworths.
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The Wadsworths incorrectly argue that the Consent did not incorporate the Assignment
and Assumption Agreement or any other document. The Consent clearly states that "attached
hereto marked as Exhibits A and B is a copy of a proposed Warranty Deed, and an Assignment
and Assumption Agreement for that pnrpose."75 Part of the Consent is the Assignment and
Assumption Agreement by virtue of it being attached as an exhibit. Paragraph two reads:
Buyers now desire to transfer their interest in the property to BLAIR GROVER and
JOANN Grover (Grovers), his wife, of309 North 4500 East, Rigby, Idaho. Attached
hereto marked Exhibits A and B is a copy of a proposed Warranty Deed, and an
Assignment and Assumption Agreement for that purpose. As set forth therein, Grovers
will assume the balance owed on the note and continue making payments thereon
according to its terms. 76
The Grovers agreed "as set forth [in the Assignment and Assumption Agreement]" to make
payments pursuant to the terms of the Assignment and Assumption Agreement. The Grovers
agreed to pay approximately $56,000 for the property and that number was specifically stated in
the closing documents as $54,984.23. 77 Grammatically, the only antecedent that the "therein"
could possibly be referring to is the Assignment and Assumption Agreement. Thus, the
Wadsworths clearly assented to the Grovers' assumption of a Note with a $54,984.23 balance.
The requirement of Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 747 P.2d 1315 (Ct. App. 1987),
that "some form of assent or agreement is required to convert [a statement of account] to an
account stated" has been fully satisfied in this case. Here, Earl drafted the amortization
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schedule. 78 The Wadsworths consented to the $54,984.23 balance in a written, signed
document. 79 The Wadsworths used the $54,984.23 amount for approximately seven years
following the 1997 transaction. 80
The Wadsworths' efforts to distinguish Needs fail. First, the Wadsworths fail to
recognize that the Wadsworths sent the regular statements to the Grovers. The Wadsworths were
the source of the information and the statements of account. Since the Wadsworths were the
source of the statements, they acquiesced to the correctness of the account stated. See MT.
Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614,617, 759 P.2d 905,908 (Ct. App. 1988). The

W adsworths repeatedly sent the statements to the Grovers over nearly a decade. All of the
statements were based on the original $54,984.23 number. Thus, there was mutual assent and
the decision of the district court should be affirmed.
3. Any mistake was unilateral and is not a defense.
The Wadsworths argue that a mistake was made. However, the Wadsworths never
presented any evidence to the Court or the Grovers establishing a mistake. The Wadsworths
have never explained what error occurred and how it was made. Norma Wadsworth testified that
she would have to assume that a mistake was made when Earl started keeping the books for the
Note. 81 The Wadsworths have only alleged that a mistake was made in the calculation of the
78
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Note's payments. Earl was the exclusive bookkeeper for the payments on the building. 82 Norma
Wadsworth did not then, and does not now, understand interest or principal. 83 Norma was not
involved in the transaction and only briefly assisted Earl in 2005 when he claimed a mistake.

84

There were several unknown factors to the Grovers that could have affected the balance
of the Note. The Wadsworths could have forgiven a portion of the loan, Jensen could have prepaid part of the loan, and there could have been off-sets. All of these were unknowns to the
Grovers at the time they inquired into the Note's balance. 85
Regardless, any mistake that would have been made as to the Note's balance would have
been a unilateral mistake. Judge St. Clair correctly found that Earl made a unilateral mistake
regarding the balance of the Promissory Note. 86 "A unilateral mistake is not normally grounds
for relief for the mistaken party, whereas a mutual mistake is." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636,
639,671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). "The mistake must be material or, in other words, so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties." Id. "A mutual mistake occurs
when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or
vital fact upon which they based their bargain." Id. The Wadsworths should not be allowed to
recover based on their own unilateral mistake.
82
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The Restatement comments:
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances
that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him ifhe does not bear the risk of the
mistake under the rule stated in§ 154, and (a) the effect of the mistake is such that
enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to
know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 153.
Here, the Grovers did not make a mistake. The only party mistaken as to the amount
owing was Earl. Earl was the only party who could have known what the balance on the
Promissory Note was in any of the years preceding 1997 and after. He alone held the note. He
did all the book-keeping for the transaction. 87 If any party should have known of an error in the
1996/1997 amortization schedule it would have been the Wadsworths and not the Grover.
"Courts have traditionally been reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract on the ground of
mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a. Since the Grovers could not possibly have
known whether the amount provided by the Wadsworths was incorrect, the Wadsworths should
be bound to Earl's representation. Otherwise, the Grovers will suffer a gross inequity.
The Wadsworths acknowledge that both the Grovers and the Wadsworths "believed the
stated outstanding balance was consistent with the amortized payment schedu!e."

88

The Grovers

could not, then, have ]mown otherwise. The Wadsworths have cited no authority that states that
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the contract should be reformed under these circumstances. Indeed, the Wadsworths' suggestion
that "the mistake does not need to be a mutual mistake to act as a defense to an account stated"
does not defeat the black letter Idaho law on unilateral mistakes.
The Wadsworths rely on Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1988). 89 However,
this non-binding Wyoming case is distinguishable from the facts of this case. Mathis involved
the original contract for sale between the original seller and the original buyer. Id. at 162-63.
Here, the Grovers are not the original buyers of the property. At the time the Grovers stepped
into the transaction and assumed the balance of the Note, the Grovers had no knowledge of
whether there had been pre-payments by Jensen, forgiveness, off-sets, or other adjustments. 90
The Grovers requested an accurate statement of the Note's balance from the Wadsworths and the
Wadsworths provided the Grovers with the handwritten amortization. 91 The Wadsworths also
signed the Consent. 92 Therefore, this case is entirely distinct from the Mathis decision.
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because the 1996/1997 amortization schedule was included in the packet of documents used at
closing. R Vol. II, pp. 223.
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Norma Wadsworth claims to not have read or seen the entire document that she signed. This

is immaterial. Failure to read a contract does not absolve a signor of responsibility under the
contract. Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652,658, 39 P.3d 592,598 (2001).
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The district court appropriately noted that the "final payment date is not a material term
of the Note, and is at best secondary to the terms of the agreement identifying the balance owed
and the interest rate."93 The district court's comment is entirely logical. The original contract
between Gaston and the Wadsworths allowed for prepayments. 94 The Grovers agreed to pay a
certain amount: $54,984.23. 95 The Grovers agreed to pay that at $777.28 per month at 10
percent interest. The date that the last payment would be made is immaterial to the agreement to
pay a specific amount. The ultimate pay-off date is only tangentially related to the ultimate
obligation to pay a specified amount. No one disputes that the Grovers are obligated to pay
$54,984.23 and did so. Thus, the Wadsworths are not allowed to benefit from their own
unilateral mistake and the decision of the district court should be upheld.
4. The district court properly applied the doctrine of estoppel.
The Wadsworths raise their objection to the application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel for the first time on appeal. The Court has long recognized that an issue raised for the
first time on appeal will not be considered by the Court. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 2008 Ida. LEXIS
57, *14-*15 (March 28, 2008) (citing McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323
(2003)). Thus, the Court should not address the Wadsworths' argument concerning the
applicability of promissory estoppel.
Even if this Court is inclined to consider the Wadsworths' objection, the elements of
93
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promissory estoppel have all been met. The elements of promissory estoppe!9 6 are the following:
I. The detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense;
2. Substantial loss to the promise acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable
by the promisor; and,
3. The promissee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as
made.

Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 29, 56 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002). This
doctrine was applied alternatively as another theory supporting judgment to the Grovers. It is not
necessary for the district court's judgment to be sustained on this theory. However, the district
court correctly applied this theory in awarding summary judgment to the Grovers.

a. The Wadsworths made specific representations to the Grovers.
The Wadsworths' representations to the Grovers that the balance of the Note was
$54,984.23 constitute a promise that the Grovers would only be required to pay that amount in
order to satisfy their obligations. The Wadsworths' efforts to parse the definition of promise are
simply unavailing. The Wadsworths' representation of the Note's balance was a "promise" that
the balance was $54,984.23. 1t was a promise as to what the Grovers would ultimately pay-off
96

The concept of promissory estoppel is an extension of the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel

prevents a person from showing the truth contrary to a representation of fact made by him after
another has relied on the representation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 90, cmt. a.
Thus, even if the court misapplied the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the doctrine of estoppel
certainly applies in this case.

Respondent Brief 25

for the building. Earl's representation was an assurance as to the balance of the Note. Any
reasonable person would have taken Earl's representation to be a final and accurate statement of
the ultimate obligation under the Note. In essence, Earl promised that if $54,984.23 at ten
percent interest was paid, that he would not exercise his rights under that contract. 97 The
Wadsworths consented to the $54,984.23 amount, promised that the amount was accurate, and
promised that the Wadsworths would not contest it. The reasonable and logical inference from
the evidence is that the Wadsworths represented an accurate amount to the Grovers.
The Wadsworths agree that the handwritten amortization schedules were statements.of
the Note's balance. They were not estimates, opinions, or predictions; instead, the handwritten
amortizations were definite statements of the Note's balance and the evidence only suggests that
the Grovers believed that the Wadsworths' representations were accurate. Further, the
Wadsworths cannot seriously argue that the Grovers did not have the document at the time of the
sale because the handwritten amortization schedule is a part of the closing documents. 98 There is
no proof that the Wadsworths received anything less than what they were entitled to under the
Contract. Thus, the W adsworths made specific representations to the Grovers.
b. The Grovers' reliance was foreseeable.
The Wadsworths blatantly misrepresent the record to the Court when they argue that
"there is no evidence showing Wadsworths even knew of Grovers' identity, let alone what
97

Setting aside any consideration of the new contract that was formed between the Grovers and

the Wadsworths on the account stated theory.
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contract negotiations were taking place between Gaston and Grover."99 That statement is
inaccurate for several reasons. First, Gaston requested the 1996/1997 amortization schedule
from the Wads worths for the express purpose of ascertaining the balance of the Note at the time
of the sale from Gaston to the Grovers. 100 Second, the 1996/1997 amortization schedule
expressly refers to the sale of the property to Blair Grover. 101 Third, the 1996/1997 amortization
schedule was included in the closing documents for the sale. 102 Fourth, the Wadsworths signed
the Consent prior to the sale closing between the Grovers and Gaston. 103 The Grovers only
agreed to assume the debt as represented by the Wadsworths in the amount of$54,984.23. The
Wadsworths' arguments are simply untenable. Thus, the Grovers' reliance was foreseeable.
c. The Grovers' reliance was reasonable and justified.
The Grovers' reliance on the Wadsworths' representations of the Note's balance was
justified and reasonable under the circumstances. The Wadsworths held the Note. The
Wadsworths did all of the book-keeping related to the payments on the Note. Gaston agreed
with the Wadsworths' representation of the amount owed on the Note. The Grovers were
unaware of any of the payments that had or had not been made prior to the transaction. There
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was simply no way for the Grovers to verify the accuracy of the amounts. Any amortization
schedule that the Grovers would have created would have been based on Earl's representations.
The Wadsworths make several arguments why the Grovers' reliance was unreasonable.

104

The Wadsworths' arguments fail for several reasons.
1. Blair Grover being an attorney is irrelevant. When an original seller and an original
buyer agreed on a Note's balance, Blair's practice was to accept those
representations. 105 The most reasonable and logical inference from the evidence is
that Blair was justified relying on both Gaston's and Earl's representations of the
$54,984.23 amount.
2. That the amortization schedules were handwritten is similarly irrelevant. There is no
evidence in the record that Earl did not use an amortization program or financial
104

There is an endemic problem with much of the Wadsworths' arguments. Throughout their

brief they rely on citations to depositions that were never made a part of the record on summary
judgment or on appeal. The following citations are not, and were not, a part of the record:
Norma Wadsworth Dep. 32:1-33:18; Grover Dep. 12:3-15:25; 22:1-19; 62:21-63:20; and all
citations to Gaston's deposition. The district court could not draw inferences on evidence not in
the record. This Court cannot fault the district court and reverse its decision. See Hunting v.
Clark County Sch. Dist.No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 637, 931 P.2d 628, 631 (1997) (stating that an

appellate court reviews the record before the trial court to determine if there are genuine issues of
material fact preventing summary judgment.)
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calculator when calculating the amortized amounts. That Earl hand-wrote the
amortization schedule is not probative of accuracy or inaccuracy. Mistakes can be
made even in computer generated amortization schedules. 106 Earl repeatedly affirmed
the $54,984.23 amount over the course of seven years. Thus, there was never any
reason for the Grovers to suspect that the amount the Wadsworths represented was
incorrect.
3. The Grovers knew that there was a Note. The Grovers were fine assuming the
payments on the Note; however, the Grovers had to know the precise amount owed
on the Note at the time they assumed the payment obligations. Both the Wadsworths
and Gaston agreed that the balance was $54,984.23.
4. Whether the Grovers ever met with the Wadsworths is immaterial. The Wadsworths
prepared and furnished the 1996/1997 amortization schedule. The Wadsworths
signed the Consent. There is no authority that requires a face to face meeting in order
for there to be justified reliance. The Wadsworth's proposition is absurd.
5. The Grovers understood that they would be obligated to pay $54,984.23 at ten percent
interest. The Grovers were aware that payments would be $777.28 per month. The
Grovers were not aware that an alleged mistake had ever been made. Indeed, the
Wadsworths have never explained what caused the mistake or how it occurred in this
106

The verified counterclaim alleges that the Wadsworths were owed iu excess of$40,000.00.

This, of course, is inaccurate according to the W adsworths' own "corrected" amortization table
and amended counterclaims.
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litigation. All that the Wadsworths have presented are assumptions, supposition, and
allegations that a mistake was made. No testimony or other evidence has ever been
admitted establishing the mistake and the Grovers have never conceded the existence
of a mistake.
6. The Grovers never knew whether Earl had received prepayments from Jensen or
Gaston. The Grovers did not know if all the payments had been timely made by
Jensen or Gaston. The Grovers did not know whether Earl forgave part of the debt.
The Grovers did not know whether there had been any additional off-sets of the debt.
The only thing that the Grovers did know was the representation by the Wadsworths
that the balance of the Note was $54,984.23. Thus, the Grovers' reliance on this
amount was entirely justified.
The Wadsworths arguments all fail. The district court acted properly in determining that
the Grovers reasonably relied on the Wadsworths' promises.
d. The Court should affirm even if Promissory Estoppel is improper.
Even if the Court agrees with the Wadsworths that the district court improperly granted
the Grovers' motion based on promissory estoppel, the Court may still affirm the district court
upon the correct theory. See Reidv. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389,392, 94 P.3d 694,697 (2004). The
doctrine of estoppel should prevent the Wadsworths from taking a position opposite of their
previous position that the $54,984.23 balance was correct. The most probable inference from the
evidence suggests that the Grovers relied on the Wadsworths' representations. The Grovers
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believed that those representations were entirely accurate. The Wadsworths should be estopped
from claiming that a different amount is owed.
The Grovers needed to know the balance of the Note because the amount owed would
define the Grovers' obligation to the Wadsworths. If the Note had a higher balance then the
Grovers would have paid Gaston less than what the Grovers actually paid.

B. The district court appropriately awarded the Grovers their attorney fees.
1. Standard of Review.

The district court's decision to award attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 576, 130 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2006).
However, when an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard
of review for statutory interpretation applies. Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of
law over which this Court exercises free review." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. # 84,
142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). The court must construe a statute to give effect
to the legislature's intent. Stout v. Key Training Corp., 158 P.3d 971,973 (Idaho 2007).
The question of what constitutes a "reasonable" attorney fee involves a discretionary
determination by the trial court. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872,876,811 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App.
1991 ). In exercising this discretion, the court must act consistently with the applicable legal
standards listed in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Id.; Assocs. Nw. v. Beets, 112 Idaho
603,605, 733 P.2d 824,825 (Ct. App. 1987). Failure to specifically address each separate factor
does not, by itself, constitute an abuse of discretion. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency. Inc. v. Murphy,
122 Idaho 270, 277, 833 P.2d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 1992). In determining the amount of attorney
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fees to award under Idaho Code§ 12-120, a district court is vested with discretion. Spidell v.

Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 860, 727 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 1986). The sequence of inquiry to
determine whether a trial court abused its discretion is:
(1 )Whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise ofreason.

Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 81, 741 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987). The district court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees to the Grovers.

2. The case involves a commercial transaction.
The Wadsworths' arguments about the nature of this case are wrong. The case involves a
transaction that is not for personal or household purposes. The commercial transaction forms the
basis upon which the Grovers and the Wadsworths both sought to recover. Consequently, the
district court's finding that the suit involves a commercial transaction should be affirmed.
A commercial transaction is defined as all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120(3). An award of attorney fees is proper if the
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is
attempting to recover. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723 728, 152 P.3d 594,
599 (2007). There are some decisions that discuss whether the commercial transaction
constituted the "gravamen" of the lawsuit. See, e.g., Dennet v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,936 P.2d
219 (1997); Cox v. Clayton, 137 Idaho 492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002).
Here, the legal claims raised in the Grovers' complaint and in the counterclaim assert a
breach of contract. The subject contract was a real estate purchase contract. The real estate
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purchased was a piece of commercial property. The building was purchased so the Grovers' son
could run a business. The transaction had nothing to do with personal or household purposes.
In a sense, this case is similar to transaction in the Blimka decision. In Blimka, a party
purchased 26,500 pairs of jeans. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728, 152 P.3d at 599. Though the
purchase of the jeans could have been for Blimka's personal use, it was clear to the court that the
jeans were purchased in order to be marketed. Id. Here, the purchased building was to be used
to market the Grovers' son's outdoor business. The transaction was not for the Grovers' or the
Wadsworths' personal or household purposes and within§ 12-120(3)'s parameters.
Indeed, as the district court aptly noted, in order for the Grovers to have title quieted in
their name, the Grovers had to show that they satisfied their contractual duties and obligations.
The underlying transaction, then, was integral to the Grovers' claim to quiet title in the property.
The Wadsworths have not disputed that the underlying commercial transaction related directly to
their claims against the Grovers. The Court should evaluate the claims in this lawsuit from an
overall perspective. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho
716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). The district court should determine which party prevailed in
the action and awards a commensurate fee. Id.; IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 12-120(3). As a result, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that§ 12-120(3) applied to this lawsuit.

3. Blair Grover's status as au attorney with Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA.
The Wadsworths rely on Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d
909 (Ct. App. 1989), for their suggestions that the Grovers should be barred from recovering
their attorney fees since Blair Grover is "Of Counsel" at Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA. Swanson

Rc,snondent Brief 33

& Setzke does not control in this case. The issue in Swanson & Setzke, centered on a law firm's

suit against its former clients. Id. at 199, 774 P.2d at 909. The law firm itself was the client and
sued the defendant to collect a debt due to the law firm. Id. In this case, the Grovers engaged
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA to represent the Grovers in this action. The subject matter of the
lawsuit is not a collection of debt owed to Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA. The subject matter is
exclusively personal to the Grovers in their individual capacity and is not a matter related to
Blair Grover's occupation as an attorney or his employment with Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA.
"The phrase 'attorney fee' may be interpreted to denote a monetary obligation (a fee)
paid or owed from one person (a client) to another person who has provided legal representation
(an attorney.)" Id. at 200; 774 P.2d at 910. Such a relationship exists in this case. The Grovers
regularly paid Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA. The payment of fees to Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
demonstrates the precise relationship discussed in the Swanson & Setzke decision. "Attorney
fees 'presupposes a relationship of attorney and client' which does not exist in pro se situations."

Id. "If the phrase 'attorney fee' denotes the existence ofan attorney-client relationship, it
matters not that the client also happens to be a lawyer." Id. at 202, 774 P .2d at 912.
The attorney-client relationship existed between Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA and the
Grovers. The Grovers exercised attorney-client privilege in this case. The Grovers never
appeared prose at any of the hearings nor did the Grovers ever make oral argument, either
personally or telephonically, before the district court. Instead, attorneys from Beard St. Clair
Gaffney PA appeared and argued on its clients behalf. Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA's attorneys
offered objective counsel to the Grovers throughout the course of the litigation. The Grovers
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were actually in the People's Republic of China teaching English for more than a year after the
litigation commenced. There is no question that the attorney-client relationship existed between
the Grovers and Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA.
Therefore, the Grovers are entitled to their attorney fees and are not barred from
recovering those fees merely because Blair Grover is an attorney or associated with Beard St.
Clair Gaffney PA. The matter is not a firm matter for Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA. Beard St.
Clair Gaffuey PA is not attempting to recover on a debt from one of its fonner clients. Instead,
the law firm is representing a client and a proper attorney-client relationship exists between the
Grovers and their attorneys. The Grovers are entitled to their fees.
Regardless, the Swanson & Setkze decision should be overturned by this Court. The
decision fails to recognize the opportunity costs incurred by pro se litigants. The time spent by
prose litigants can be substantial, especially in the event of non-lawyers appearing on their own

behalf. For attorneys or law firms suing on their own behalf, the time spent by the law firm on
its cases and matters is time that could have otherwise been spent on other clients' cases. There
is a real opportunity cost that is incurred by pro se litigants and the law should provide a method
through which all prose litigants can be compensated for those costs. Thus, the Swanson &
Setkze decision should be overruled by this Court.

4. Attorney fees were properly awarded against Norma Wadsworth.
The Wadsworths argue that Norma should not be responsible for attorney fees because
"she was not an owner of the Northgate property, provided none of the statements, and should
not be individually responsible for attorney fees." The Wadsworths' argument is specious.
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The Wadsworths are essentially arguing that even though Norma Wadsworth sued the
Grovers by virtue of her counterclaims that she should not be responsible for the attorney fees
incurred in defending her lawsuit. The Wadsworths also suggest, without a legal basis, that
Norma should receive the benefits of the Grovers' payments but should not be responsible for
the attorney fees and costs in litigation that she is partially responsible for by virtue of her
counterclaims. The Wadsworths' argument makes no sense and Norma is a proper person to
have attorney fees awarded against.

C. Denial of Summary Judgment is not reviewable.
An order denying summary judgment after a jury trial is 11011-reviewable. Gunter v.

Murphy's Lounge, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 16, 26, 105 P.3d 676,686 (2005). An order denying a
motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself, nor is it reviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002).
Therefore, the Court should not consider the Wadsworths' arguments that it was error for the
district court to deny their motion for summary judgment. Instead, the Court should review the
final judgment and order. Id.

IV.

CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's findings.
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